India’s Parliament Must Not Stage Its Cadaver Synod
The trial of Pope Formosus during the Cadaver Synod of 897 CE remains one of history’s most extraordinary examples of institutional excess.
Although the pope had been dead for months, his body was exhumed, dressed in papal robes, placed on trial, declared guilty, and symbolically punished.
Instead of restoring justice, the proceedings damaged the credibility of the Church and became a lasting reminder that legal authority loses legitimacy when exercised without a meaningful constitutional purpose.
This historical episode provides an apt analogy for the constitutional debate surrounding the impeachment proceedings initiated against former Justice Yashwant Varma after his resignation.
Constitutional Purpose of Impeachment
The Indian Constitution envisages impeachment solely as a mechanism to remove an unfit judge from constitutional office.
Article 121 permits Parliament to discuss the conduct of judges only during proceedings seeking their removal.
Similarly, Articles 124(4) and 217, read with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, establish that removal from office is the only constitutional consequence of impeachment.
Once a judge resigns, the constitutional office ceases to exist. As a result, the machinery created for removal loses its legal purpose because there is no office left to vacate.
Continuing the process after resignation would therefore extend constitutional authority beyond its intended limits.
Resignation as a Constitutional Act
A judge occupies a constitutional office rather than an ordinary government post.
The Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra (1978), held that a judge’s resignation is a unilateral constitutional act requiring no acceptance from the President or any executive authority.
The constitutional relationship ends immediately upon resignation.
This principle has also been reflected in constitutional practice.
The impeachment proceedings against Justice P.D. Dinakaran ended after his resignation, while the proceedings against Justice Soumitra Sen also came to a close once he resigned despite the Rajya Sabha having already adopted the removal motion.
These precedents affirm that resignation extinguishes Parliament’s jurisdiction to continue removal proceedings.
Implications for Judicial Independence
Allowing impeachment proceedings to continue after resignation would create a dangerous constitutional precedent.
If Parliament retains authority over a resigned judge, there would be little constitutional basis to distinguish such cases from those involving retired or even deceased judges.
Future legislatures could revisit judicial decisions delivered years earlier and initiate proceedings motivated by changing political circumstances.
Such a practice would weaken judicial independence, disturb the separation of powers, and expose judges to the fear of post-retirement political retaliation.
Constitutional democracies depend not only upon independent judges but also upon institutions that respect the constitutional limits of their own authority
